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Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) investigations into crimes 
of aggression should not depend on a green light from the 
UN Security Council. The OTP should, however, be 
careful not to exercise its competence in such a way as to 
undermine the legal framework governing the use of force.  
The implication of [the Kampala activation] compromise—disappointingly lacking in 
ambition and difficult to reconcile with the original promise of Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute—is that prosecutions will be possible only in respect of leaders of a small circle of 
countries.  
Summary  
I. Introduction  
On December 14, 2017, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute decided by 
consensus to activate the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of July 17, 2018.1 
The historical decision finally makes true on the promise created by the original inclusion of 
the crime of aggression when the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 (Article 5 (1) of the 
Rome Statute). What is more, the decision at long last revives the legacy of the post-War 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, where military and political leaders were first (and—so 
far—last) criminally prosecuted for “crimes against the peace.”  
The consensus decision did come at a heavy price. While it was previously affirmed (at the 
time of the adoption of the 2010 Kampala amendments)2 that the jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression would not be exercised against nationals of non-States parties to the Rome 
Statute3 or of States Parties making use of the opt-out mechanism,4 jurisdiction was further 
curtailed by the activation decision. In particular, the decision stipulates that in the case of a 
State referral or proprio motu investigation, “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a State 
Party that has not ratified or accepted [the Kampala amendments].”5  
The implication of this compromise—disappointingly lacking in ambition and difficult to 
reconcile with the original promise of Article 5 of the Rome Statute—is that prosecutions will 
be possible only in respect of leaders of a small circle of countries. More than seven years 
after their adoption, some thirty-five States have effectively ratified the Kampala 
amendments. It follows that investigations into crimes of aggression will in all likelihood 
remain exceptional and that it may take years for the first such investigation to materialize. 
On the other hand, inasmuch as every cross-border operation potentially raises questions as to 
its legality,6 sooner or later the OTP will inevitably have to address allegations that a crime of 
aggression has been committed.7  
When (rather than if) this happens, the OTP will be confronted with a range of challenges, 
some of which are ostensibly unique to the prosecution of aggressors. The present essay 
briefly focuses on two such challenges, specifically the relationship with the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), and the application of the primary rules on the use of force (the so-called jus 
contra bellum)8.  
Collapse  
Argument  
II. OTP investigations into crimes of aggression should not depend on a green light from 
the UNSC.9  
In spite of the post-War trials, where individuals were first prosecuted for “crimes against the 
peace” (notably at the initiative of the United States), and in spite of its inclusion in the Rome 
Statute, some continue to resist the idea that the crime of aggression constitutes a justiciable 
crime. In the words of Koh and Buchwald:  
Aggression determinations are fundamentally different in kind [from determinations of 
atrocity crimes]: they fundamentally require a political assessment and political 
management.10  
Or as Rostow puts it: “[d]eterminations of aggression are political and rightly so.”11  
Attempts to conceive determinations of aggression as a purely political question are 
illustrative of the perverse and flawed tendency, still very much en vogue today, to surgically 
detach the political decision-making process leading up to the launch of a military 
intervention from the loss of life (among civilians and combatants) and destruction (e.g., in 
terms of damage to the economy or governmental institutions) that all too frequently follows. 
This tendency is also reflected in the dominant normative account which views the crime of 
aggression as a political crime, which “yields an abstract harm,”12 rather than as a compound 
of wrongs against individuals (civilians and combatants), that entails “the slaughter of human 
life, the infliction of human suffering, and the erosion of human security.”13  
Furthermore, this approach ignores not only the legacy of the 1928 Pact of Paris—which first 
outlawed the recourse to war14—and the Nuremberg proceedings, it is also fundamentally at 
odds with the fact that the International Court of Justice has repeatedly pronounced (directly 
or indirectly) on the compatibility of State conduct with the rules governing the use of 
force15—as have a number of arbitral tribunals.16 This case-law unequivocally confirms that, 
notwithstanding the politically sensitive nature of the charges, State responsibility for 
aggression is a justiciable matter that international courts and tribunals can rule upon 
independently (within the confines of their jurisdiction).  
In the 1980s, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not shy away from assessing the 
legality of the US military intervention in the famous Nicaragua v. U.S. case—
notwithstanding US’ objections that the case involved an inherently political problem and 
notwithstanding warnings that the ICJ’s bold approach would destroy its legitimacy and result 
in an empty docket (which has certainly not been the case). By analogy, the OTP should not 
shy away from actively seeking to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression. Only by 
acting in such manner will it be possible to undo the myth that high-level decisions to deploy 
armed forces abroad are beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny, and hold political and military 
leaders to account for the harm caused. This is all the more so since the (remote) prospect of 
the State being held internationally responsible for ignoring the jus contra bellum is unlikely 
to play a determining role in decisions over the use of armed force. By contrast, the risk of 
facing individual criminal responsibility may weigh heavier in the minds of the decision-
makers concerned. As Dinstein puts it:  
Only if it dawns on the actual decision-makers that—when they carry their country along the 
path of war in contravention of international law—they expose themselves to individual 
criminal accountability, are they likely to hesitate before taking the fateful step.17  
The OTP should not let itself be shackled by making investigations into the crime of 
aggression dependent on a green light from the UNSC. No such legal requirement follows 
from the Charter of the United Nations,  [hereinafter UN Charter]. Article 39  of the UN 
Charter, which decrees that the UNSC can take enforcement action in case of a “threat to the 
peace,” a “breach of the peace” or an “act of aggression,” is merely an institutional provision, 
which defines the situations in which the UNSC may use its Chapter VII powers. Such 
enforcement action is not limited to situations where there has been a prior breach of 
international law: a “threat to the peace,” for instance, does not necessarily presuppose the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by any State. Article 39 of the UN Charter was 
never intended to have the UNSC act as a judicial body, asserting legal responsibility for 
wrongful conduct.  
It has moreover amply been affirmed that the UNSC’s competence to determine an act of 
aggression is not exclusive. Thus, the absence of a prior finding of aggression by the UNSC 
has not stopped the ICJ or arbitral tribunals from pronouncing on the legality of the use of 
force by States.18 Nor has it stopped the UN General Assembly from pronouncing on the 
legality of military interventions.19 Suggestions that there is a legal requirement under 
international law which makes ICC investigations into the crime of aggression dependent 
upon prior approval by the UNSC are all the more absurd in light of the (extremely) narrow 
jurisdiction ratione personae in respect of this crime. Indeed, inasmuch as jurisdiction is 
limited to political and military leaders of countries that have ratified the Kampala 
amendments (without having used the opt out), this dispels any lingering doubts that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would somehow contravene the so-called Monetary Gold principle.20  
Making OTP investigations contingent on a green light from the UNSC is not only not legally 
required, it would also be detrimental to the Court’s legitimacy and nullify the potential of the 
Kampala amendments. It would make OTP investigations hostage to political interests and 
create a perception of victor’s justice and double standards. Investigations into the conduct of 
any P-5 ally would be all but excluded. More generally, the prospect of any investigations into 
crimes of aggression would be extremely remote: Security Council resolutions referring to 
“(acts of) aggression” indeed remain rare—not a single such resolution has been adopted 
since the end of the Cold War.21 By voluntarily subjecting itself to the whims and vagaries of 
the UNSC, the OTP would undo the main achievement of the Kampala negotiations, where it 
was indeed decided to essentially decouple the jurisdiction of the Court, as an independent 
judicial organ, from the UNSC decision-making process.22  
In conclusion, the OTP should make full use of its competence under the Kampala 
amendments—including in respect of military operations by coalitions that encompass both 
States that have ratified the amendments and States that have not.23 At the same time, the 
preferred approach must be for investigations to be started pursuant to a State referral, rather 
than on a proprio motu basis. Indeed, to the extent that a crime of aggression presupposes an 
act of aggression which, in light of its scale, effects and character, qualifies as a manifest 
breach of the UN Charter,  it can normally be assumed that the victim of such aggression will 
declare itself as such and will raise the matter before the ICC.24 When the “victim State” 
refrains from so acting, this raises doubts as to whether there indeed exists a manifest breach 
of the UN Charter. Admittedly, there may be situations where a State referral is de facto 
unlikely or impossible and which call for a proprio motu investigation, e.g., where an 
aggressor overruns another country and installs a puppet regime. It is also conceivable that a 
victim State uses the threat of a State referral as leverage in negotiations with the aggressor 
(e.g., to arrive at a peace agreement). Such situations may call for restraint from the OTP and 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
III. The OTP should be careful not to exercise its competence in such a way as to erode 
the legal framework governing the use of force25  
A specific challenge resulting from the—now activated—ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression is that it will force the Court to tackle a new domain of international law, which it 
has hitherto not had to explore. As is well-known, the jus contra bellum is one of the oldest 
branches of international law—and also one of the most hotly debated. In spite of the 
somewhat utopian assertion in the Nicaragua v. U.S. case that there exists “general 
agreement” on what amounts to an “armed attack” in the context of the right of self-
defence,26 the truth is that the “law on the use of force” is rife with controversies. In 
particular, there has been strong pressure in recent years to loosen some of the traditional 
legal restrictions on the recourse to force. To some extent, this tendency is understandable, 
given the evolving nature of threats to State security (chiefly the advance of trans-national 
terrorist groups, such as ISIL/Daesh). At the same time, calls for a more flexible regime on 
the recourse to force tend to create a slippery slope, opening room for abuse and threatening 
to erode the fundamental prohibition of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  
One implication of the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is that 
the ICC (and the OTP in particular) will henceforth play a key role in the interpretation of the 
jus contra bellum. Just as the case-law of the ICC (and the ICTY and ICTR before it) has left, 
and continues to leave, its mark on the interpretation of the law of armed conflict, the same 
will become true in the realm of the jus contra bellum. It is imperative in this context that the 
ICC build on the existing acquis in this domain, as reflected in the case-law of the ICJ, legal 
doctrine and State practice, and, moreover, that it be aware of the implications that its 
approach may have for this legal regime.  
The Rome Statute provides for a variety of tools that can potentially be used to justify a 
refusal to investigate, or prosecute, alleged crimes of aggression. Possible escape routes 
include the presumption of innocence and the requirement to construe the definition of crimes 
strictly (Articles 66 and 22 of the Rome Statute); the notion of mistake of fact (Article 32 of 
the Rome Statute),27 and; duress and defence of others (Article 31 (c)–(d) of the Rome 
Statute). By contrast, a leader’s alleged lack of an aggressive intent or an alleged mistake of 
law will not normally shield him or her from prosecution.28 An additional route results from 
the substantive threshold introduced at Kampala. Indeed, pursuant to the Kampala definition, 
not any recourse to force can give rise to a crime of aggression: only uses of force that, by 
their “character, gravity and scale,” constitute a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter  can 
qualify as such. Thus, an isolated and relatively small-scale drone strike or a minor border 
skirmish would not possess the gravity and scale required under Article 8 bis (1) of the Rome 
Statute. Although the ICC has been given “very little guidance as to where to draw the line in 
the sand,”29 the Court should use the above tools when appropriate. At the same time, it 
should do so cautiously, without turning the crime of aggression into a dead letter and signing 
off on a climate of impunity.  
The most controversial of the above-mentioned tools concerns the requirement pertaining to 
the “manifest character” of the breach. This criterion was introduced specifically to exclude 
prosecutions in respect of military interventions falling in the grey zone of the jus contra 
bellum, that is, interventions that are not manifestly unlawful but which are nonetheless of 
ambiguous legality. The archetypical example of such intervention is that of a bona fide 
unilateral humanitarian intervention (such as NATO’s Kosovo intervention in 1999), where 
one or more third States intervene militarily to protect foreign nationals from ethnic cleansing 
or massive human rights violations in a third State, yet absent proper authorization from the 
UNSC. Even if the majority view—to which the present author subscribes—holds that 
unilateral humanitarian interventions remain unlawful de lege lata and require the imprimatur 
of the UNSC, there is a strong, and legitimate, feeling that the authors of such intervention 
should not be put on par with the Nazi leaders put on trial in Nuremberg, and should not 
become the subject of criminal prosecution. Apart from the much-debated humanitarian 
intervention doctrine, several other borderline cases have been put forward. Possible 
candidates include action in self-defence against an allegedly imminent threat of an armed 
attack, action in self-defence against a non-State armed group conducting cross-border attacks 
(without substantial involvement of a third State), or so-called “protection of nationals” 
operations abroad. Two observations are nonetheless in order.  
First, the OTP should be cognizant that any finding that a recourse to force is not of such 
character as to qualify as a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter  will reinforce the 
perception that interventions of the type concerned are not “unambiguously unlawful.” This 
will be the case even if the Prosecutor (or the Court) would refrain from taking an express 
position on the application of the jus contra bellum (and simply find there to is no “manifest” 
breach of the UN Charter). As Murphy aptly observes:  
[A] distinction of this type will likely be lost in the public domain; when the ICC determines 
that the leaders of an intervention will not be investigated or indicted for aggression, the 
natural perception is that the ICC believes the intervention to be legal. Arguing that an 
intervention might still be a violation of Article 2 (4) but just is not within the scope of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction is the type of position that will likely gain little traction in the realm of 
political and popular discourse, which tends to approach such issues in more a black/white 
(legal/illegal) fashion.30  
Thus, a decision of this type would probably leave its mark on State practice and opinio juris, 
possibly leading a growing number of States to (more) explicitly embrace the legality of the 
category of interventions concerned, e.g. in national military doctrines, and potentially leading 
to a shift in the justificatory discourse at the international level, from which the legal regime 
on the use of force derives much (if not most) of its compliance pull. It follows that, in order 
to avoid undue damage to the primary rules of the jus contra bellum framework, the ICC 
should exercise the necessary restraint in applying the “manifest character” criterion. In 
particular, it may be preferable to use other approaches to close an investigation into alleged 
crimes of aggression, for instance, by holding that a relatively minor intervention is not 
sufficiently manifest in terms of scale or gravity, rather than by playing the card of the 
“borderline case.”  
Second, in examining alleged crimes of aggression, the ICC should not stop at verifying the 
existence of an initial casus fœderis or “just cause” (in the olden “just war” terminology), but 
should also verify whether other jus contra bellum parameters are duly complied with. By 
way of illustration, in respect of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the ICC should arguably 
first verify whether the operation constituted a reaction to a grave and large-scale 
humanitarian crisis (produced either by State action, State neglect or a failed State situation), 
and whether other options were reasonably exhausted. In this context, relevant indications 
(rather than autonomous requirements) may include, among other things, the collective nature 
of an operation carried out by multiple States, or the fact that an attempt was made to secure 
prior UNSC approval. Yet, beyond this, the Court should also pay heed to the proportionality 
question. In particular, the Court should verify, having regard to the planning and 
implementation, that the operation did not manifestly exceed the aim of ending the 
humanitarian catastrophe that triggered it. Similar considerations apply mutatis mutandis in 
respect of protection of nationals operations.  
In a similar vein, in respect of the generally established exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force, the ICC should not content itself with ascertaining that a military operation 
constitutes a reaction to a prior “armed attack” (in case of self-defence) or was undertaken 
pursuant to a formal authorization of the UNSC. Rather, the Court should additionally verify 
that the State did not deliberately engage in a manifestly disproportionate response in the 
aftermath of an armed attack, or that it did not manifestly overstep the boundaries of the 
UNSC mandate. By the same token, with respect to so-called “interventions by invitation,” in 
addition to verifying the existence of a valid request to intervene, the Court must ascertain 
that the intervening State did not manifestly exceed the scope of the invitation. Whether the 
ICC should feel called upon to tackle the permissibility of intervention by invitation in 
situations of civil war31 is a different matter altogether. One possible answer could be that, in 
such scenario, what is at stake is not so much a breach of the prohibition on the use of force, 
but rather a possible breach of the non-intervention principle and especially the right of self-
determination, implying that no crime of aggression could be said to arise.  
It goes without saying that the activation of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression presents the Court with daunting challenges. It forces the ICC to assume the role 
of key interpreter in one of the most sensitive domains of international law. Depending on 
how it implements this role, the ICC may well contribute to a certain erosion of the legal 
framework governing the use of force, indirectly lending credence to some more 
“expansionist” claims in legal doctrine. Conversely, if the ICC manages to strike the right 
balance, it may well contribute to bringing greater legal certainty in the jus contra bellum and 
provoking a rapprochement between competing interpretations of the outer limits of the legal 
framework governing the use of force.  
Given its unprecedented nature, the prosecutions of individual leaders of “crimes against the 
peace” proved to be one of the most controversial aspects of the Nuremberg proceedings,32 
yet it was undoubtedly also one of its main achievements. The time is ripe for the ICC to pick 
up the legacy of Nuremberg, reminiscent of its hard-learnt lesson that:  
To initiate a war of aggression… is the supreme international crime, differing only from other 
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.33  
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